Research Seminar: Eliezer M. Fich, Drexel University
|4 November 2016
|13:00-14:00 (Timezone: Europe/London)
|ICMA Centre, Whiteknights campus
Abstract: Shareholders’ updated valuation of internal slack reveals their revised assessment of potential agency conflicts. We study how the value of internal cash changes following state antitakeover regulation events. After carefully addressing the critiques of such experiments, we find that the value of cash increases following antitakeover law implementation, but there is considerable heterogeneity in how the value changes. Firms more susceptible to quiet-life agency problems show no increases in the market-assessed value of internal slack. Conversely, cash appreciates in companies where takeover protection helps bond important commitments with major counterparties. These findings hold across different measures of antitakeover protection events.